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SOCIAL DYNAMICS 16(2) 56 - 70 1990
THE ANC'S CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES:
THE CASE FOR DEVOLUTION
Robert Cameron
This paper is an analysis of the African National Congress' constitutional
proposals with particular reference to the centralisation versus decentralisa-
tion debate. One of the main features of the proposals is a predominately cen-
tralised state, a policy position that the author disagrees with. It is contended
that some of the arguments used in favour of a centralised state could also be
used to justify a decentralised state. It is further argued that some of its objec-
tives cannot be realised through a central state.
INTRODUCTION
The ANC's constitutional provisions are the most explicit exposition of its
policy yet. There is however a certain amount of debate about the specificity
of the proposals. Lodge (1988 : 17) calls them a detailed blueprint, while a
correspondent of South argues that the draft guidelines should be regarded as
non-specific and general. The constitution, it is argued, should be formulated
by a sovereign, popularly elected constituent assembly (South, 6 - 1 2 July,
1989).
Nevertheless, these guidelines are coherent and warrant serious academic,
analytical discussion. The particular concern of this paper is to examine the
ANC's prescription for intergovernmental relations; namely the relationships
of power and control between the various tiers of the government.
Under its constitutional guidelines in respect of the state it is mentioned
that:
(a) South Africa shall be an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial
state;
(b) Sovereignty shall belong to the people as a whole and shall be exercised
through one central legislature, executive, judiciary and administration.
Provision shall be made for the delegation of the powers of the central
authority to subordinate administrative units for the purposes of more ef-
ficient administration and democratic participation.
It can be seen that the main feature is a predominantly central state with a
certain amount of delegation. The aim of this paper, with reference to com-
parative experience, is critically to analyse these proposals. It is contended
that some of the arguments used in favour of a centralised state could also be
used to justify a decentralised state. It is further argued that some of its objec-
tives cannot be realised through a central state.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TERMINOLOGY
Delegation of powers is one of the most important features of the ANC's
proposed intergovernmental relationship. What precisely does this mean?
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES 57
It should be pointed out that there is little conformity when it comes to the
use of concepts in the field of intergovernmental relations. It is contended that
the most useful classification is that of Rondinelli (1981) who clearly distin-
guishes the various forms of decentralisation in a way that other definitions
fail to achieve.
Decentralisation is defined as 'the transfer of responsibility for planning,
management and resource use and allocation from the central government and
its agencies to field organisations of these agencies, subordinate units of gov-
ernment, semi-autonomous public corporations, or non-governmental private
or voluntary organisations' (Rondinelli, 1981 : 137).
Devolution is the most extensive form of decentralisation. It is the 'confer-
ment of rule-making and executive powers of a specified or residual nature on
formally constituted sub-national units' (Vosloo, Kotze and Jeppe, 1974 : 10).
This is the classical English local government model and it has the following
characteristics:
1. Local authorities should be constitutionally separate from central govern-
ment and be responsible for a significant range of services;
2. They should have their own treasury, separate budget and accounts and
their own taxes to produce a substantial part of their revenue;
3. Local authorities should have their own personnel with the right to hire
and fire such staff;
4. Policy should be decided by local councils, predominantly consisting of
elected representatives.
5. Central government administrators should only play an indirect advisory,
supervisory and inspectorate role (Mawhood and Davey, 1980 : 405;
Mawhood, 1983 : 9-10 and 1987 : 12).
Déconcentration is the least extensive form of decentralisation. This in-
volves the transfer of the workload from the central government head offices
to regional branches located out of the executive capital (Rondinelli,
1981 : 137 and Maddick, 1963 : 23). It may involve limited discretion for
field staff to perform functions within central government guidelines. How-
ever, effective control over major policy decisions resides at central level.
Delegation falls somewhere between decentralisation and déconcentration
along the continuum. It involves the transfer of broad authority to plan and
implement decisions concerning specific activities to organisations that are
technically and administratively capable of performing them (Rondinelli,
1981 : 138). Delegated power is normally controlled by the attachment of
conditions by the delegating body. Policy is made at central government level,
but the process of execution and administration occurs at local level. The
delegating body has the authority to modify, reduce or withdraw such powers
if it so desires (Fesler, 1968 : 372-3). Delegation highlights the fact that a
large workload at local level does not necessarily mean extensive devolution.
Fesler (1968 : 373) calls what has been defined as delegation and décon-
centration 'pseudo-decentralisation' because its motivation is administrative
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convenience, namely to reduce the workload in the capital. This administra-
tive overburden often leads to excessive delays and inefficiency (Maddick,
1963 : 34). Dear and Clark (1981 : 1280-81) go even further and argue that
these forms of decentralisation are motivated by a crisis-avoidance strategy of
central government. By transferring the execution of contentious issues to
local government level, it is hoped that the legitimacy crisis of the central
state will be reversed. In other words, the aim is to ensure that citizen de-
mands for services are directed at a local level and consequently remove some
of the pressure from the national level. However, policy making still resides
at the national level. Any dissatisfaction about service provision would also
be at local government level which would have to deal with affects that are
not of its own making. Déconcentration and delegation however can lead to
limited discretion in planning and implementing national programmes at local
level and adjusting central directives to local conditions within national gui-
delines (Rondinelli, 1984 : 10). While such a process could be the first step
towards greater decentralisation (Rondinelli, 1981 : 137) there is no guarantee
that this will necessarily be the case.
Centralisation generally has negative connotations, often being associated
with red tape, rigidity and remoteness. This term is often used in an emotive
way to label things that are disliked about political and administrative systems
(Smith, 1979 : 215). However, centralisation needs to be defined in a more
schematic way.
Sherwood (1969 : 68) suggests that 'centralisation is best defined as invol-
ving the concentration of power at the top of the pyramid'. A more compre-
hensive definition is that of Kaufman's:
A centralised organisation or institution is one in which the lower levels and employees
assigned thereto are subject to central directives and discipline and identify in one way
or another with the centralised leadership, for example, professionally, by interests, or in
goals and values. Central control of finances and public policy are basic elements. Ma-
chinery for communications, reporting, inspection, record-keeping and conflict resolu-
tion will exist at the higher level or at least be responsible to the central unit (cited in
Stephens, 1974 :68).
Each of these various forms of power relationships will reflect a quite dif-
ferent set of central-local relationships with the locus of power being located
at different levels along the centralisation-decentralisation continuum.
It has been suggested that the ANC is referring both to delegation and de-
volution of powers when it talks about delegation of powers to local auth-
orities. However, it is the viewpoint of both Lodge (1988 : 18) and the writer
that the delegation must be understood in the abovementioned context; that
local government is not vested with independent policy making powers. This
interpretation seems to be confirmed by an ANC legal expert who argued that
local authorities should be seen as agents of the central government (Lodge,
1988 : 19).
The writer has previously pointed out that it appeared as if local govern-
ment restructuring in South Africa is leading to extensive centralisation of
powers (Cameron, 1986). Despite these recent developments, South African
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local authorities still have devolved powers in respect to functions such as
streets, pavements, storm-water drainage, planning, passenger transport ser-
vices, reticulation of electricity and water, parks and sports grounds, alloca-
tion of grants-in-aids etc. The ANC's proposals do not appear to make
provision for any devolution of power, for all policy decisions pertaining to
local government services would be made at central level, with the process of
decisions and their execution and administration occuring at local level. If
these proposals are taken literally, it would mean that local authorities would
not even be able to make policy about such mundane issues such as rubbish
removal and the tarring of roads.
Further, it is not even clear if provision is going to be made for elected rep-
resentative bodies at local level. The clause which states that 'sovereignty
should be exercised through one central legislature' seems to imply that this
will not be the case. It appears that local authorities will not enjoy a separate
legal existence from central government, as is currently the case. If this is so,
one cannot talk about local authorities, but rather deconcentrated administra-
tion; viz. regional and local offices of central administration.
THE VALUES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Maass' (1959) seminal text on local government argued that the existence
of local authorities was justified on the grounds that it promoted the values of
liberty, participation and efficiency. Each of these claims will be examined in
detail.
.Promotion of Liberty/Democracy
Maass (1959) argues that local government promotes the value of liberty
for if power is divided on an areal basis, it can protect individuals and groups
against arbitrary government action.
Strong local government is viewed as an important mechanism of limiting
or counter-balancing the power of central government (Werlin, 1980 : 186).
Devolution by dispersing resources tends to dilute the power of the strongest
(Kochen and Deutsch, 1980 : 201). This type of argument strongly influenced
the framers of the United States constitution and is part of its system of
checks-and-balances.
However, while these arrangements have undoubtedly prevented the
growth of central tyrannies they have not always the stopped the development
of local autocracies. Sharpe (1970 : 156-8) argues that there is no reason why
a local government cannot infringe on individual rights in the same way as
certain central governments have done. Central government does not have a
monopoly on arbitrariness.
There is nothing inherently progressive about devolution. Fesler
(1965 : 545) points out firstly, that both local and national government can
take a number of forms and neither has a distinctive impulse towards democ-
racy. Secondly, devolution can quite happily co-exist in the absence of local
democracy. Local autonomy can quite feasibly operate in an autocratic envi-
ronment. For example, in the United States indiscretion of southern sub-na-
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tional units towards their minorities led to greater federal control. Devolved
powers allowed such localities to neglect civil rights and the demands of the
poor (Dye 1978 : 45-75).
Participation
The second value of local government is that of participation. Government
power can be divided so as to provide broad opportunities for citizen partici-
pation in public policy, this has a democratic effect (Maass, 1959 : 9-10).
It is argued that this claim has more substance than the liberty argument.
Participation at local government level is superior to that of central govern-
ment level, because it enables more citizens to participate in their own gov-
ernment. This is of particular salience in larger democracies (Sharpe,
1970: 166).
This is a forceful argument, and the gist of it is supported but with a vital
key qualifying condition which is conceded by Sharpe (1970 : 160): 'The key
question is participation in the government of what?' Participation tends to be
somewhat meaningless unless there are sufficient functions over which local
authorities have a broad range of decision-making powers and sufficient fin-
ancial resources to carry them out.
Responsiveness/Efficiency
The third value of local government is that it is supposed to be a more re-
sponsive agent for the provision of services that are essentially local in nature.
It is accordingly a more efficient way of managing local affairs and of provid-
ing local services. This is sometimes known as the welfare function of local
government (Ylvisaker, 1959 : 32 and Smith, 1985 : 28).
The basis of this justification is that central government has neither the
time, nor inclination, to establish the optimal mixture of services desired by
each locality. Local governments, because of the greater closeness to their vo-
ters, are likely to have greater knowledge of the needs and conditions of their
respective localities than the remote central governments (Sharpe, 1970 : 166;
Stewart, 1983 : 16 and Smith, 1985 : 28-30). Why cannot the field agencies of
central government departments perform these local identification tasks? The
problem is that such single-function agencies, based on functional specialisa-
tion and departmentalism, would not be able to coordinate all these diverse
activities in an efficient way. Local authorities, being multi-functional organi-
sations, would be capable of doing so (Sharpe, 1970 : 166).
Both Sharpe (1970 : 168) and Stewart (1983 : 13-14) think this claim for a
responsive service provision agency has strong validity. Sharpe argues the
justification for the responsiveness value is on much stronger ground than the
liberty value. There are however certain problems with this proposition. Fir-
stly, it fallaciously assumes that local citizens have a superior wisdom in cor-
rectly identifying both local needs and the optimal amount of services to meet
them. A related point is that this claim ignores the reality of conflicting needs
in the same community and the fact that certain classes/interest groups have
greater ability to influence local policy-making (Smith, 1985 : 29).
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Finally, the question of responsiveness is intimately linked to the issue of
accountability and control. It is argued that decision-makers are responsive to
local demands precisely because they are accountable to local voters and vo-
ters hold decision-makers responsible for their actions. Councillors who ig-
nore the wishes of the electorate will be voted out of office. Voter control is
thought to be the ultimate form of control (Rondinelli, 1981 : 135). The prob-
lem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that there is large-scale ignor-
ance and apathy about local government. Turnouts are notably low at local
elections, which are often decided not by local but rather by national issues
(Foster, Jackman and Perlman, 1982 : 16).
However, such factors seem to be a problem of representative government
generally, rather than local government specifically. Election turnouts are
often low at national level. A case can also be made for flawed accountability
at this level by arguing that it is impossible for voters to make an informed
judgement about government policy when faced with making choices about
such a large number of disparate issues at election time. Voters tend to make
their electoral judgements on the basis of a few selective issues.
Despite these shortcomings, local government is still a more preferable ser-
vice-providing body than deconcentrated administration. There is generally
greater scope to influence representative local authorities through the electoral
process than there is to persuade non-representative deconcentrated adminis-
trations to alter their policy (Smith, 1985 : 27).
How can the ANC's proposals be evaluated in the light of this discussion
of the values of local government? Turning first to the liberty value, a concern
that local authorities will practice racial, social and economic discrimination
seems to underly part of the ANC's centralist thrust. Lodge (1988 : 18) points
out that at an internal ANC seminar held at Lusaka it was argued that central
government should not be excluded from intervening in certain local or re-
gional affairs. However, reactionary local policies of the Boksburg and Carl-
tonville variety can be averted through measures other than central control.
For example, the ANC's proposed Bill of Rights could outlaw racial policies.
Further, independent administrative courts with quasi-judicial powers, such as
exist in certain Western European countries, could be established. They
could have the authority to hear appeals against certain decisions of local
authorities and in so doing, act as a further barrier against unjust local
policies.
In so far as the participation value is concerned, it is not clear if provision
is going to be made for elected representative bodies at local level. The ANC
needs to spell out its position in this regard in more detail. Does it see local
authorities as independently, elected bodies or as forms of deconcentrated ad-
ministration? If the latter is the case, then such centralist trends would run
counter to the internal practices of many of the community organisations
which sprung up in the 1980s to oppose the state. Grassroots democracy, ac-
countability and a participation in decision-making characterised many of
these organisations (Matiwana and Walters, 1986). Such a policy position
also seems at variance with organisations sympathetic to the ANC, such as
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the UDF and some of its affiliates such as JORAC, which have supported the
principle of devolution of power (Bekker, Le Père and Tomlinson, 1986 : 56).
It is disputable whether democratic representation is going to be enhanced by
only having representation in one central legislature.
However, it must be stressed that devolution of power to local authorities is
only the first step in the process of enhancing citizen participation in policy.
Devolution should not be done in a way that empowers local bureaucrats or
renders councillors unaccountable to the communities that elected them. To
enhance participation, sub-municipal units with genuine powers need to be in-
troduced at neighbourhood level.
The ANC's proposals fail dismally in terms of the responsiveness value.
Centralised systems have shown themselves to be highly unresponsive to
local demands and conditions. Mawhood (1989 : 4) argues that the history of
local government in Africa can be seen in terms of a pendulum model. During
the terminal colonial period of the 1950's, the classic English local govern-
ment model existed in a number of countries. One of the major reasons for its
disappearance soon after independence was the viewpoint amongst both libe-
ral and Marxist economists in the Third World in the 1960s that rapid econ-
omic development needed centralised planning. This led to the centralised
decision-making with a concommitant loss of local government powers.
There was a belief that the limited funds should be utilised in terms of an inte-
grated list of priorities (Kasfir, 1983 : 36; Mawhood, 1983 : 6).
However, in the 1970s there were moves back towards decentralisation.
The main reason for this was the spectacular failure of centralised planning
and control. Central decision-making proved itself to be wasteful, ineffective
and unresponsive to local conditions. Congestion occured at the centre. The
over-concentration of power, authority and resources at national capitals led
to red tape and highly structured hierarchies which resulted in extensive de-
lays in developmental projects. There was a realisation that citizens had to be
won over to developmental objectives and that there should be some form of
local input into the decision-making process. This return toward decentralisa-
tion initially took the form of what were termed 'mixed models' which con-
sisted of central and local government representatives. However, these
councils generally operated as a form of central representation. The problems
of centralised models still remained. As a result in certain countries there has
been a return to local government systems that bear a strong resemblance to
the English model that existed prior to decolonisation in the 1980s (Maw-
hood, 1983 : 6-7, 1987 : 13).
It is therefore a contradiction in terms to argue that 'more efficient admin-
istration' can be achieved by a centralised state. In fact it is strange that the
ANC should attempt to introduce the moribund centralised system at a time
when even architects of the system, the USSR, are jettisoning this model be-
cause of its inefficiency.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND EQUALITY
The ANC is pushing, initially at any rate, for a social welfare state. As
Lodge (1988 : 19) points out the ANC believes that a strong centralised state
would be the most effective guarantee for the realisation of 'second gener-
ation rights' which includes the right to health, shelter, nutrition etc.
A belief that devolution is an obstacle to social justice pervades the ANC's
proposals. It reflects an orthodox socialist position that the centre is the only
tier of government able to secure the equitable distribution of public resources
on the basis of need (Bogdanor, 1979 : 195). The proposals implicitly imply
that a devolved system would lead to identical individuals in different lo-
calities receiving different levels of services by local governments with va-
rying tax bases; a process that would exacerbate regional/local inequality.
This, in turn, would contravene Buchanan's principle of fiscal equity : equal
treatment of citizens whatever their geographical location (Oates, 1977 : 12-
13; Paddison, 1983 : 168-169; Bramley, 1987 : 77).
However, the viewpoint that socialism and social democracy necessarily
entail a strong centralised state to ensure equality of treatment for all its
citizens is disputed. There is no fundamental contradiction between a commit-
ment to equality and to devolution. As McDonnell (cited in Gyford,
1985 : 73) points out: 'Decentralisation is politically neutral . . . what is cru-
cial is the form of decentralisation and the political philosophy behind it'
(Decentralisation in this sense is used as a synonym for devolution). Social-
ism has not always been associated with state control. The left has an anti-
state or libertarian socialist wing, which dates back to the late 19th century, of
which anarchism was perhaps the most dominant strand. Further, this argu-
ment that socialism and social democracy require a centralised form of gov-
ernment and therefore curtailment of local government autonomy, does not
stand up to contemporary comparative scrutiny. Yugoslavia has devolved
powers to such an extent that Volyges (1986 : 165) claims that the 'autonomy
of republics and provinces of Yugoslavia certainly matches and often exceeds
the autonomy that the individual American states have'. Further, in France in
the 1980s, the Socialist Party introduced a programme of decentralisation of
powers (which included extensive devolution) to local government (Keating
and Hainsworth, 1986).
This problem of geographical inequality is not irresolvable. Intergovern-
mental grants can be used both to equalise disparities between the revenue
bases of richer and poorer local authorities and to equalise varying expendi-
ture needs of local authorities. Grants can sometimes lead to greater central
control. However, there is no consistent relationship between central control
and financial independence (Smith, 1979 : 35). Countries such as pre-
Thatcher Britain made use of a scientific formula to equalise disparities in
wealth at the local level (Byrne, 1986 : 203-206).
Further, there has also been the steady growth of decentralised socialism in
Western Europe since the French uprising in 1968 with its commitment to
self-management ideals. In Britain there has been the rise of municipal social-
ism in the 1980's. Gyford suggests that although these socialists are not a ho-
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mogenous grouping, it is nevertheless possible to identify certain common
characteristics amongst them:
1) They are striving for a new grassroots way of achieving socialism, di-
vorced from both the centralised and insurrectionary routes;
2) They have a commitment to mass politics based on the strategy of decen-
tralised decision-making; and/or political mobilisation at the local level;
3) There is the belief that the equation of socialism with centralisation and
state control was becoming an electoral liability as it had become associ-
ated with a remote bureaucracy and alienation (1985 : 17-18,41).
A leading contemporary Labour Party socialist in the United Kingdom has
claimed that Labour's turn to centralisation and nationalisation, rather than to
local democratic control, was its greatest mistake (Blunkett, 1987 : 64-69).
It is thus suggested that serious attention be given by the ANC to introduc-
ing its social welfare state in a devolved fashion.
UNITARISM VS FEDERALISM
These ANC proposals are quite unequivocal in their support for a unitary
state and, conversely, the rejection of a federal state. Federalism is regarded
as being synonymous with devolution but this is not necessarily the case. This
issue will be returned to later. Why is the ANC opposed to federalism?
1) The independent and self-governing 'homelands' are forms of federalism.
There is the fear that the conservative elites in such areas would be con-
stituent elements in any post-apartheid federal structure. Clause (K) of the
proposals - 'that the advocacy or practice of inter alia the incitement of
ethnic or regional exclusiveness shall be outlawed' - must partly be seen
in this light.
2) Federalism with its checks and balances on power is seen as a mechanism
to prevent redistribution of wealth. Political devolution is seen as an ex-
tention of the market system. In South Africa, Lombard and du Pisani
(1985) and Louw and Kendall (1986) have proposed post-apartheid con-
stitutional options with extensive devolution of powers to local units,
along with a rather neutered central state with limited potential to equalise
wealth. (For criticism of this rightwing form of federalism see Cameron
1986,1989).
As with decentralisation there are different forms of federalism. Besides
this rather ultra free-market version of capitalism, there is also orthodox free-
market federalism (in the USA) social democratic federalism (in West Ger-
many) and socialist federalism (in Yugoslavia). The latter three forms of
federalism, in varying degrees, make provision for redistribution of wealth to
both poorer geographical areas and to individuals.
It is often regarded as almost axiomatic that the constitional first tier
framework is the definitive factor affecting local government autonomy.
Federal states were thought to facilitate devolution; in fact federalism and de-
volution were almost thought to be synonymous (Riker, 1975; Lockard,
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1968 : 452-453 and Ostrom, 1973). It was held that in federal states power is
divided between the various tiers of government and the rights of sub-national
units generally are derived from the constitution and cannot be abridged by
national legislation (Wheare, 1981 : 10; Alexander, 1982 : 3-4).
Conversely, it was held that in a unitary state, power is indivisible and
local government is subordinate to the supremacy of national level legislation
(Alexander, 1982 : 3-4). However, this equation of unitarism = centralisation
and federalism = devolution is too simple. Things tend to be more complex in
reality. There are different forms of federal states. The common conception of
federalism is that it divides sovereignty. Yet, as Calvert (1975 : 8) points out,
this is a legal definition. In practice, the location of power may be centralised
or devolved, so that it can range from resembling a confederation on the one
hand to a unitary state on the other. A federal state can have both autonomous
and dependent local governments (Gelfand, 1985 : 239).
Further, and rather ironically, in the Third World, there seems to be an in-
herent conflict between federal arrangements and decentralisation of powers
to local authorities. In countries such as Nigeria and Brazil second tier state
authorities have been particularly centralist towards local authorities, often
denying them financial resources. This is because they regard thriving local
governments as a threat to their own power (Mawhood, 1989 : 5-6).
Similarly, there are different forms of unitary states. As Calvert (1975 : 8-
9) points out, the idea that sovereignty is undivided and wholly located at the
. centre in a unitary state is also a legal definition. It does not preclude the dis-
tribution of authority, both vertically and horizontally. Some unitary states
have devolved significant powers to local level, for example, local govern-
ments in Sweden and Holland (both unitary states) have a high degree of local
autonomy (Lockard, 1968 : 454). Dagtoglou (1975 : 135-6) argues that the
decision between federalism and unitarism is a constitutional one, while the
choice between centralisation and devolution relates mainly to public admin-
istration. Thus, there can be a difference between the formal constitutional
provisions of a state and its actual political functioning.
These factors have tended to blur the differences between federal and uni-
tary states in respect to devolution. If federal states can on the one hand be so-
cialist, social-democratic, or capitalist and on the other hand be centralist or
decentralist, what difference does it then make whether South Africa has a
unitary or federal state? It is contended that this federalism vs unitarism de-
bate if not exactly a non-issue, is certainly exaggerated in importance. Smith
(1979 : 15) argues that the only crucial difference is the theoretical procedures
required to amend the intergovernmental relationships. In federal states this
involves independent adjudication and the representation of the constituent
elements at central government level. In unitary states, it is theoretically
possible for central government to revoke all sub-national unit autonomy. It
also means that the 'homelands' do not owe their creation or future existence
to federalism. They could easily continue to exist with considerable autonomy
in a post-apartheid unitary state.
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NATIONAL IDENTITY
Another important reason for centralisation is the need to promote national
identity. Clause (g) of the proposals states that 'it shall be state policy to pro-
mote the growth of a single national unity and loyalty binding on all South
Africans. At the same time, the state shall recognise the linguistic and cultural
diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural
development'.
Whether the promotion of national identity is desirable, remains moot.
There is a certain viewpoint which posits that all forms of nationalism are in-
herently chauvinistic and reactionary. However, if the promotion of national
identity is an important reason for the ANC wanting to centralise, it must be
seriously examined.
The argument in favour of centralisation was that colonists randomly drew
up the boundaries of many Third World countries and particularly so in Afri-
ca. This often brought disparate and in some cases rival groupings, with little
in common, into the same nation state. Accordingly, after decolonisation,
many politically developing countries needed to promote integration and had
to centralise in order to overcome the parochial loyalties that threatened the
break-up of the nation (Fesler, 1968).
Olowu (1988 : 18-19) points out that the view that political integration can
be achieved by the imposition of core cultures and values came under severe
criticism in Africa because it stimulated further strife and even secessionist
movements. As a result there was a move towards promoting national identity
through decentralisation. Decentralisation thus was used as an instrument of
state-building and as a counter to secessionist pressures and other centrifugal
forces that threatened political stability (Paddison, 1983 : 151). Decentralisa-
tion sometimes resulted from the demands of ethnic/linguistic/regional mi-
norities who desire greater autonomy. The argument was that political,
stability and national unity can be improved by giving minorities in different
parts of the country the ability to participate more directly in decision-making
at sub-national level. The objective was to improve the legitimacy of the sys-
tem by giving minorities a 'stake' in the system. (Rondinelli, 1981 : 136,
Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984 : 20, Johnson, 1979 : 238).
NATIONAL STABILITY
A point closely related to national unity is the question of national stability.
Given that the ANC comes to power, the mode of transition will affect the de-
gree of devolution. If there is a relatively smooth transition to power and the
new ANC government is relatively strong and unchallenged the chances for
devolution are good. However, if there are AWB and Inkatha counter-revol-
utionaries attempting to destabilise the new government, the prospect of the
ANC devolving power is less propitious.
If the very fabric of a state is threatened, democracy is not likely to exist at
all levels of government (cited in Sherwood, 1969 : 75). Rowat (1980 : 604),
Maddick (1963 : 40-41, 111), Dawson (1978 : 80), Tordoff (1980 : 387) and
Mawhood (1983 : 253-254) all argue that insecure governments with a nar-
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row basis of legitimacy will be reluctant to decentralise powers to local auth-
orities because of the fear that they may be building up centres of opposition
to their own rule.
CONCLUSION
To summarise: it appears that local government discrimination can be safe-
guarded against by measures other than central control, participation is best
served by having elected local decision-making bodies, and central govern-
ment authorities have shown themselves to have been highly unresponsive to
local conditions and demands. Socialism and social democracy can be
achieved through both centralist and devolved systems. Similarly, federalism
can be centralist or devolved, as well as capitalist or socialist. It seems that
national unity can best be promoted through or decentralist means. This
means that every argument that the ANC has used to justify a centralised
state, has been countered bar one: the need for national stability. If the ANC
comes to power facing a possible civil war, it is highly probably that it will
curtail pluralism at all levels of government. However, the theoretical possi-
bility of civil war in the future is not by itself sufficient grounds to justify a
highly centralised system.
This is not to suggest that devolution should be introduced in an indiscrimi-
nate fashion. Devolution in developing countries has been a failure when
there has been a lack of financial resources, skilled staff and organisational
capabilities available to local authorities, for all of these hamper their efforts
to perform the functions allocated to them (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema,
1984 : 63-69). Certain local authorities in a democratic South Africa would
undoubtedly also lack these resources. It seems inevitable that a certain
amount of central control initially would be needed to develop these local
authorities to a position where they have the capacity to fulfill their obliga-
tions efficiently and effectively. If international experience can be used a
yardstick, the powers available to these developing local authorities would
rest on a combination of policies involving devolution, déconcentration and
delegation (Conyers, 1983 : 123-124).
However, my premise 'devolve unless there are insufficient resources' is
fundamentally different to that of the ANC's 'centralise, although delegation
may occur due to administrative convenience'.
If the ANC proposals are only guidelines for discussion then it should seri-
ously reconsider advocating the introduction of this moribund centralised sys-
tem. It is also suggested that the ANC give greater clarity to their views about
the role of local authorities under this proposed system. Elsewhere I have
concluded that if the growing trend towards centralisation continued the only
powers that existing local authorities would be left with would be of the
'grass verge and pothole' variety (Cameron, 1986 : 77). If the ANC regards
local authorities only as agents of the state, then such authorities would not
even have control over these limited functions. This is neither desirable nor
practical.
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